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CIVIL RIGHTS PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS 
CARL TOBIAS* 
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 1 primarily to modify 
numerous Supreme Court opinions of the 1988 Term that jeopardized 
the rights of minorities and women. Particularly striking about those 
Supreme Court cases was the number which involved procedural ques-
tions and process values. These included the timing of litigation, both 
when employment discrimination victims must commence actions and 
when non-parties can reopen civil rights cases resolved through consent 
decrees; litigant responsibility for the expense of lawsuits; and proof 
requirements. 
Most of the procedural developments in civil rights and employment 
discrimination litigation of the 1988 Term, however, were only recent 
manifestations of judicial decisionmaking that has disadvantaged civil 
rights and employment discrimination plaintiffs over the past fifteen 
years. Moreover, the determinations encompass restrictive interpreta-
tions by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, fee-shifting legislation, and procedural provisions in 
civil rights and employment discrimination statutes. 
In short, the whole picture for civil rights and employment discrimina-
tion litigation has been more than the sum of the procedural parts. The 
federal judiciary's decisionmaking has adversely affected civil rights and 
employment discrimination plaintiffs, who Congress intended to serve as 
private attorneys general, but whose lack of resources for litigating often 
makes them risk averse. 2 Because these judicial determinations 
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Steve Bahls, Bill Corbett, Larry 
Elison, Tom Huff, Rob Natelson, Peggy Sanner and Michael Zimmer for valuable suggestions, Sally 
Johnson and Scott Mitchell for valuable research, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for 
processing this piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are 
mine alone. 
I. PUB. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
2. Private attorneys general are individuals or groups that seek to assert the interests of non-
party discrimination victims or of the public. They have emerged because public attorneys general 
lack the requisite resources to sue or choose not to litigate for other reasons. See Bryant Garth et al., 
The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives from an Empirical Study of Class Action 
Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1988). To encourage such private litigants, Congress affords 
them procedural advantages or attorney's fees when they prevail. See Carl Tobias, Public Law Liti-
gation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CoRNELL L. REv. 270, 285, 312 (1989) [herein-
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threatened the progress that minorities and women have achieved 
through litigation, Congress enacted the new civil rights and employ-
ment discrimination legislation which rectifies or ameliorates certain pro-
cedural difficulties faced by civil rights and employment discrimination 
plaintiffs. Unfortunately, Congress did not treat a number of important 
procedural problems that significantly disadvantage civil rights plaintiffs. 
This essay addresses those omissions. 
The article initially examines procedural developments that have detri-
mentally affected civil rights plaintiffs over the last decade and a half. 
The piece then analyzes the Civil Rights Act of 1991, emphasizing how 
that measure fails to remedy numerous procedural complications which 
confront these plaintiffs. Accordingly, the essay affords suggestions for 
additional change that would respond to the procedural difficulties which 
remain. 
!. DISADVANTAGEOUS PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS 
A. The Federal Rules 
The Supreme Court's 1989 application of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure Rule 19,3 which governs compulsory party joinder, and Rule 24,4 
which covers intervention, in Martin v. Wilks 5 exemplifies the federal 
judicial interpretation of procedural requirements that has disadvantaged 
civil rights plaintiffs. The Court's construction resembles its readings of 
other federal rules and their relation to the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees 
Awards Act (Fees Act)6 as well as considerable lower federal court en-
forcement of yet additional rules, such as Rule 11 pertaining to 
sanctions. 7 
after Tobias, Public Law Litigation]. Because many discrimination victims possess relatively few 
resources, adverse judicial determinations can chill their enthusiasm to file suit. See Carl Tobias, 
Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 485, 495-98 (1988-1989) [hereinafter Tobias, 
Rule 1 J]. "Civi,1 rights plaintiff" includes "employment discrimination plaintiff," unless the latter 
term is specifically used. 
3. FED. R. C1v. P. 19. 
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 24. 
5. 490 U.S. 755 (1989). 
6. 42 u.s.c. § 1988 (1982). 
7. For discussion of the Fees Act and its interrelationships with other Rules, sec Tobias, Pub-
lic Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 313-17. See also Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front l11 the Flght 
for Civil Rights: The Supreme Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291 (1990) 
(comprehensive analysis of Supreme Court's fee-shifting jurisprudence, especially relating to the 
Fees Act). 
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I. Rules 19 and 24 
In Martin v. Wilks, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the position of the 
majority of circuits. These courts had not required civil rights plaintiffs, 
such as black fire fighters whose employment discrimination cases 
against employers result in consent decrees, to sue absentees, specifically 
white fire fighters whose job advancement the plaintiffs' litigation might 
jeopardize. Instead, the courts had demanded that the absentees inter-
vene in the employment discrimination actions and had proscribed their 
pursuit of separate, subsequent lawsuits as "impermissible collateral at-
tacks" on the consent decrees. 8 Rejecting this appellate court resolution, 
the Supreme Court did not require absentees to intervene in employment 
discrimination cases which might prejudice them. The court stated that 
consent decrees entered in such litigation can only bind those who were 
made parties to the lawsuits. 
This ruling meant that civil rights plaintiffs whose cases could have 
resulted in consent decrees were required to sue all absentees who may 
have been prejudiced or risk having absentees collaterally attack the de-
crees after their signing, as many absentees did. That approach under-
mined the effectiveness of consent decrees-which had proved to be a 
valuable mechanism for expeditiously resolving much civil rights litiga-
tion-by reducing the incentives for plaintiffs and defendants to enter 
into them. The Court's interpretation required that civil rights plaintiffs 
spend substantial, additional resources on litigating their cases, often to 
conclusion. Under Martin v. Wilks, even if civil rights plaintiffs were 
able to persuade defendants and all of the absentees joined to sign con-
sent decrees, the plaintiffs would have expended large sums identifying 
and suing those absentees. Correspondingly, a number of the plaintiffs 
sustained significant costs defending the decrees against collateral attack 
by unjoined absentees or others whom the decrees prejudiced after their 
entry. Indeed, the prospect of incurring these expenses apparently dis-
suaded some discrimination victims, who contemplated suit, from filing.9 
8. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762. That position had "sufficient appeal to have com-
manded the approval of the great majority of the Federal Courts of Appeals." Id. Analysis of the 
opinion in the remainder of this paragraph is drawn from id. at 762-69. See also Susan Grover, The 
Silenced Majority: Martin v. Wilks and the Legislative Response, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 43 (helpful 
analysis of the case); George M. Strickler, Jr., Martin v. Wilks, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1557 (1990) (same). 
9. The Chief Justice also rejected a reading of the rules more solicitous of civil rights plaintiffs, 
stating that it "would require a rewriting rather than an interpretation." See Martin v. Wilks, 490 
U.S. at 767. For analysis of many federal courts' technical, private law approach to Rule 24 which 
has disadvantaged these plaintiffs and other public interest litigants, see Tobias, Public Law Litiga-
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2. Rules 68 and 23(e) and the Fees Act 
The Supreme Court's 1985 application of Rule 68 governing settle-
ment offers and its interrelationship with the Fees Act in Marek v. 
Chesny Io has similarly affected civil rights plaintiffs. The Court directly 
contravened a half-century understanding that Rule 68 "costs" did not 
encompass attorney's fees by reading the Rule to include fees under the 
Fees Act; this has meant that civil rights plaintiffs who rejected settle-
ment offers more favorable than the relief they secured at trial could not 
recover fees for services performed after rejecting the offers. II The diffi-
culty of predicting precisely what cases are worth before discovery, the 
problem of comparing defendants' monetary offers with injunctions that 
the plaintiffs frequently seek and are granted, and the threat of losing 
post-offer fees has caused some plaintiffs to settle prematurely and forgo 
broad relief (such as judicial declarations that governmental practices are 
unconstitutional) which may affect many people. The Court's resolution 
is "entirely at odds with Congress' intent."I2 
The Court's 1986 interpretation of Rule 23(e), which requires trial 
court approval of class action settlements, and the provision's relation to 
tion, supra note 2, at 322-29. See also Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 415. 
Typical cases include Ragsdale v. Turnock, 941 F.2d 501, 503-06 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Kentucky Util. Co., 927 F.2d 252, 253-55 (6th Cir. 1991). 
Martin v. Wilks could be viewed as a "timing" case, in the sense of when judicial determinations 
become final. Thus, it resembles another 1989 opinion in which the Court held that when an em-
ployer and a union allegedly have "negotiated and adopted a new seniority system with the intention 
of discriminating against women in violation of Title VII, • • • [the 300 day] limitations period set 
forth in [the statute], begins to run immediately upon the adoption of that system." See Lorance v. 
AT&T, 490 U.S. 900, 913 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). This ruling made it difficult for female 
employees to challenge certain types of discriminatory seniority systems because their discriminatory 
impact could not be anticipated. Lorance, therefore, additionally diminished Title VIl's application 
to the systems. Id. at 919. Martin v. Wilks and Lorance also must be contrasted; the opinions are 
consistent in their disadvantaging of minorities and women and their benefiting of white males. 
10. 473 U.S. 1 (1985). See also Roy D. Simon, Jr., The New Meaning of Rule 68: Marek v. 
Chesny and Beyond, 14 N.Y.U. RBv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 475 (1986) (helpful analysis of Marek). 
11. See Marek, 473 U.S. at 10-11 (majority's reading); id. at 21-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(half-century understanding). One problem with the majority's interpretation is its substitution of a 
mechanical comparison for the Fees Act's discretionary determination, which means that some 
plaintiffs whose fee requests formerly would have been granted have not been granted. See id. at 30. 
12. Id. at 32 n.48. For cases that typify the problems created for civil rights plaintiffs, see 
Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1989); Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia, 700 F. 
Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1988). For discussion of these and some additional difficulties that Marek 
poses, see Tobias, Public Low Litigation, supra note 2, at 314-16. See generally Thomas D. Rowe, 
Jr. & Neil Vidmar, Empirical Research on Offers of Settlement: A Preliminary Report, 51 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (Autumn 1988). 
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the Fees Act in Evans v. Jeff D ., 13 apparently has had analogous impacts 
on civil rights plaintiffs. Justice Stevens found that district court judges 
could approve settlements in which civil rights plaintiffs had agreed to 
waive attorney's fees to which they might have been entitled under the 
fee-shifting statute in return for substantive relief. 14 This approach ap-
pears to have complicated the efforts of discrimination victims to secure 
counsel. Plaintiffs have little reason not to waive any fees that they 
might recover; however, fewer lawyers apparently have been willing to 
accept civil rights cases, because the attorneys have reduced prospects for 
receiving their fees, a result completely inconsistent with Congress' pur-
poses in adopting the Fees Act. 15 
3. Rule 11 
Since Rule 11 's 1983 amendment, lower court enforcement of the pro-
vision has presented difficulties for civil rights plaintiffs similar to the 
problems previously discussed. The federal judiciary has found civil 
rights plaintiffs in violation of the Rule's reasonable pre-filing inquiry 
requirements more frequently than entities that pursue other types of 
civil litigation. 16 Some courts have enforced these mandates against civil 
rights plaintiffs with considerable rigor; a few judges have even levied 
substantial sanctions on them. 17 These factors appear to have chilled the 
enthusiasm of individuals who bring civil rights cases. 18 
13. 475 U.S. 717 (1986). See also Brand, supra note 7, at 328-29 (helpful analysis of Evans); 
Dana K. Apple, Note, Attorneys-The Elimination of Statutory Attorneys' Fees Through Simultane-
ous Negotiations-Evans v. Jeff D., 35 U. KAN. L. REv. 625 (1987) (same). 
14. See Evans, 475 U.S. at 737-38. 
15. See id. at 754-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For discussion of this and some additional diffi-
culties that Evans poses, see Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 316-17. There have been 
few problematic reported opinions to date, apparently because lawyers have protected themselves by 
requiring clients to sign contracts in which they agree to assume responsibility for attorney's fees. 
For one case that affords a sense of the difficulties that may arise, see Phillips v. Allegheny County, 
869 F.2d 234, 235-40 (3d Cir. 1989). 
16. See Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" 
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1327 (1986); 
Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200-01 (1988). See also ADVI-
SORY CoMMITIEE ON CIVIL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CoNFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
CALL FOR WRITTEN COMMENTS ON RULE 11 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND 
RELATED RULES, reprinted in 131 F.R.D. 344, 345 (1990) [hereinafter CALL FOR COMMENTS]. 
17. See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 913 
(1992); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991); Blue v. 
United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991). 
18. See Carl Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 105, 116-21 
(1991); Vairo, supra note 16, at 200-01. See also CALL FOR COMMENTS, supra note 16, at 345. 
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The Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the 
United States Judicial Conference recently issued a preliminary draft of a 
proposal to amend Rule 11. 19 Certain components, such as provisions 
for safe harbors and for reduced judicial reliance on fee shifting, should 
be responsive to the needs of civil rights plaintiffs.20 Nonetheless the pre-
liminary draft, if promulgated as proposed, could foster another decade 
of satellite litigation, inconsistent judicial application and chilling of civil 
rights litigation.21 
B. Fee-Shifting Legislation 
Closely related to the federal judiciary's problematic construction of 
the Federal Rules and of specific rules' interrelationships with the Fees 
Act has been its interpretation of that statute and additional fee-shifting 
legislation in ways which disadvantage civil rights plaintiffs. Congress 
passed the measures to facilitate vindication of civil rights by encourag-
ing fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs and in recognition of resource dis-
crepancies between civil rights plaintiffs and those parties they ordinarily 
oppose, such as governmental bodies and corporations.22 
The Supreme Court's 1989 reading of one of these fee-shifting provi-
sions in Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes 23 typifies its 
19. See COMMITIEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FED· 
ERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, reprinted in 137 
F.R.D. 53, 74-82 (1991) [hereinafter PROPOSED AMENDMENTS]. 
20. Safe harbors are mechanisms, such as the ability to withdraw inadequate assertions upon 
notification of their insufficiency, which insulate litigants from sanctions. See, e.g., PRELIMINARY 
DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULE l l(c)(l)(A), 137 F.R.D. 74, 76 (1991). Cf. PRELIMINARY DRAFT OP 
PROPOSED RULE 11 ADVISORY COMM. NOTE, 137 F.R.D. at 78 (preliminary draft calls for greater 
restraint in considering sanctions imposition). 
21. See Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule JI, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. No.4 (forthcoming 1992) 
(this proposition and additional analysis of preliminary draft). As this Article goes to press, in mid-
June 1992, the Standing Committee approved a final proposal, the most important aspect of which 
makes judicial imposition of sanctions discretionary. See Randall Samborn, Key Panel Votes Shift In 
Rule JI, NAT'L L.J., July 6, 1992, at 13. Certain additional changes that the Advisory Committee 
made and the Standing Committee agreed with are solicitous of civil rights, so that the proposal 
should constitute substantial improvement. 
22. The Fees Act is a typical example. Congress adopted, and the Court approved, a dual 
standard: "prevailing plaintiffs ordinarily recovered attorney's fees, but successful defendants nor-
mally did not." Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 312. For thorough analysis of fee-
shifting, see Symposium, Attorney Fee Shifting, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. 1 (Winter 1984). 
23. 491 U.S. 754 (1989). The Court addressed § 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(k) (1964), which is similar to another fee-shifting provision of that Act and the 
Fees Act. Cf. Zipes, 491 U.S. at 758 n.2 (explaining that fee-shifting statutes' similar language is a 
1992] CIVIL RIGHTS PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS 807 
own interpretations and considerable lower court jurisprudence. The 
Court narrowly construed congressional commands which were intended 
to promote meritorious civil rights litigation. In Zipes, the Court re-
jected the views of numerous circuit and trial judges; they had confirmed 
district court discretion to grant fees to civil rights plaintiffs who pre-
vailed over intervenors, employing lenient standards comparable to the 
requirements for imposing fee liability on defendants.24 Justice Scalia 
held that trial judges could only award attorney's fees against a losing 
intervenor whose "action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foun-
dation, "25 which is the same test for fixing fee responsibility on civil 
rights plaintiffs. This approach has apparently prevented some victori-
ous civil rights plaintiffs from recovering fees because: (1) the activities of 
few intervenors have been found sufficiently egregious to have violated 
that standard, (2) intervenors have made arguments that defendants nor-
mally would and, thus, insulated defendants from fee liability, and (3) 
much fee-shifting legislation is similarly phrased. 26 
Closely linked with Zipes has been the judiciary's application of the 
standard invoked in the case to require that civil rights plaintiffs pay 
their opponents' attorney's fees. 27 A Ninth Circuit panel recently re-
strong indication that they are to be interpreted alike). See also Joseph E. Koehlen, Note, When 
Worlds Collide: Intervenors and Attorney's Fees in Title VII Actions-Independent Federation of 
Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 21 ARIZ. Sr. L.J. 1201 (1989) (helpful analysis of Zipes). 
24. See 491 U.S. at 760-62. The lower courts finding discretion typically had emphasized that 
plaintiffs were prevailing parties while evincing less concern about the nature of intervenors' action, 
such as whether they were liable on the merits. Examples include: the Seventh Circuit opinion 
reversed in Zipes, Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 846 F. 2d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 1988); another opinion 
of that court, Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057, 1068-70 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 
(1989); and the cases cited by Justice Marshall in his Zipes dissent, 491 U.S. at 774 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
25. See Zipes, 491 U.S. at 760 (citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 
(1978)). 
26. See supra note 22 (first reason); Zipes, 491 U.S. at 779-80 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (second 
reason); supra note 23 (third reason). There have been relatively few problematic reported opinions 
to date. For one case that illustrates the difficulties that can arise, see Bigby v. City of Chicago, 927 
F.2d 1426, 1428-29 (7th Cir. 1991). But see United States v. City of San Francisco, 132 F.R.D. 533, 
535-38 (N.D. cal. 1990). 
The Supreme Court sharply circumscribed the expert witness fees that a prevailing party can 
recover in a civil rights case. See West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991). See 
also Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, 482 U.S. 437 (1987). See generally Tobias, Public Law 
Litigation, supra note 2, at 318-19; Maria-Elena Cigarrou, Comment, The Recoverability of Expert 
Witness Fees in Civil Rights Cases: The Post-Crawford Crisis, 10 REV. LmG. 185 (1990). But see 
infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
27. This is the Christiansburg Garment standard. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
See also supra note 22. 
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versed a district judge's denial of a defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, announced that the plaintiff's civil rights suit was frivolous, 
and stated that the plaintiff must pay the defendants' attorney's fees 
under the Fees Act. 28 In short, the Court's treatment in Zipes resembles 
considerable federal judicial interpretation of fee-shifting legislation, par-
ticularly because it restrictively viewed congressional mandates. 29 
C. Proof Requirements 
The Supreme Court's 1989 imposition of stricter proof requirements 
upon plaintiffs in an important employment discrimination context is 
similar to the stringent pleading that all of the circuit courts now demand 
of civil rights plaintiffs under Rule 8. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio,30 the Court made it more difficult for plaintiffs who allege em-
ployment discrimination to win disparate impact cases and significantly 
changed the understanding regarding proof that had prevailed since the 
28. See Maag v. Wessler, 944 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1991). In denying a request for rehearing and 
rehearing en bane, however, the panel remanded the case to the "district court for consideration of 
the appellants' request for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988." Maag v. Wessler, 960 F.2d 773, 
776 (9th Cir. 1992). Cf Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 279 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(denying a directed verdict does not, as a matter oflaw, foreclose consideration of civil rights defend· 
ant's subsequent Fees Act fee request premised on claim's frivolousness); William W. Schwarzer, 
Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1013, 1019 (1988) (questioning how a case could be so frivo-
lous as to warrant Rule 11 sanctions yet have sufficient merit to withstand summary judgment mo-
tion). See generally Foster v. Mydas Assocs., 943 F.2d 139, 143-44 (1st Cir. 1991). But see Brooks 
v. Cook, 938 F.2d 1048, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 1991); Leffier v. Meer, 936 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir. 1991). 
29. One particularly troubling Supreme Court ruling for civil rights plaintiffs and other public 
interest litigants has been Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 
711, 724-28 (1987); 478 U.S. 546 (1986). In Pennsylvania, a splintered Supreme Court sharply lim-
ited the use of multipliers of lodestar fees to compensate attorneys for assuming the risks of loss 
under most fee-shifting statutes, thus reducing their attractiveness. Last term, the Court flatly pro-
scribed their use. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 60 U.S.L.W. 4714 (June 24, 1992). Other recent 
examples of restrictive interpretations are Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760-64 (1987) (concluding 
that when respondent received no relief on the merits of his claim, he failed to qualify as a "prevail-
ing party" eligible for attorney's fees under§ 1988) and Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1 (1988) (same). 
An example of narrow lower court interpretation is that of the Fifth Circuit which the Supreme 
Court reversed in Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland lndep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791-92 
(1989). This case and others, such as Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 93 (1989), reflect ambiva-
lence in the Court's treatment of fee-shifting statutes. For a comprehensive examination of the 
Supreme Court's fee-shifting jurisprudence, see Brand, supra note 7. 
30. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See also Robert Belton, Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrines in 
Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TuL. 
L. REV. 1359 (1990) (helpful analysis of Wards Cove); L. Camille Hebert, Redefining the Burdens of 
Proof in Title VII Litigation: Will the Disparate Impact Theory Survive Wards Cove and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1990?, 32 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1990) (same). 
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Court's 1971 decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 31 Under Griggs, when 
employment practices constituted obstacles to the hiring and advance-
ment of minority workers, employers had the burden of justifying them. 
As a practical matter, the Griggs requirement had been onerous.32 
In Wards Cove, the Court demanded more of employment discrimina-
tion plaintiffs in making out prima facie cases. Justice White, who found 
the plaintiffs' statistical data relating to the results of employment 
processes insufficient, insisted that plaintiffs show specific job criteria 
which excluded minority applicants. 33 The Wards Cove majority re-
quired even more from plaintiffs after they have made out prima facie 
cases. Earlier opinions had imposed on employers the burden of proving 
that a "business necessity" justified the challenged employment prac-
tices. 34 Justice White stated, however, that employers merely have the 
burden of production, not persuasion; once they offer substantial evi-
dence of business necessity, the plaintiffs have the ultimate burden of 
convincing the fact finder that there is no such justification. 35 The Court 
also changed the substantive standard from business necessity to whether 
challenged practices significantly serve employers' legitimate employ-
ment goals. This revision requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that the prac-
tices lack any valid purpose or to suggest equally effective alternatives. 36 
Moreover, Justice White admonished lower courts analyzing the legiti-
macy of employment practices that judges are "generally less competent 
than employers to restructure business practices."37 
The new proof regime instituted in disparate impact cases is analogous 
to appellate and trial courts' imposition of strict pleading on civil rights 
plaintiffs under Rule 8. All of the federal circuits have "articulated a 
requirement of particularity in pleading for civil rights complaints."38 
31. 490 U.S. 642, 656-58. 
32. Justice Stevens thoroughly recounts the Griggs regime in his Wards Cove dissent. See 490 
U.S. at 662-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
33. "[A] plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the application ofa specific or particular employ-
ment practice that has created the disparate impact under attack." Id. at 657. 
34. See id. at 666-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting) Qisting relevant prior case law). 
35. See id. at 659-60. 
36. See id. 
37. See id. at 661. For one case that illustrates the proof difficulties that plaintiffs can confront, 
see Gilty v. Village of Oak Park, 919 F.2d 1247, 1254-55 (7th Cir. 1990). 
38. Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d I, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1984); accord, Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 
1479 (5th Cir. 1985). See also Arnold v. Board of Educ., 880 F.2d 305 (11th Cir. 1989) (recent 
example); Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading Requirements in 
Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935 (1990) (providing a thorough analysis of 
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Many courts have held that civil rights complaints which include con-
clusory, speculative or vague allegations are inadequate. These courts 
have required factual specificity about the alleged conduct that violated 
the plaintiff's rights. 39 Some judges even have demanded that the plain-
tiff offer factual showings of the defendant's actual intent to discriminate 
or that references to material facts support claims.40 These developments 
have occurred, despite the Supreme Court's clear endorsement of the 
Federal Rules' flexible, liberal pleading system in its 1957 Conley v. Gib-
son decision.41 Moreover, some judges and numerous commentators 
have persuasively questioned whether adequate judicial authority and 
empirical data support elevated pleading. 42 
Therefore, the factual particularity now required in civil rights com-
plaints is similar in its effect to the onerous proof demands that Wards 
Cove placed on plaintiffs who brought employment discrimination cases 
involving disparate impact. These requirements have impaired the ef-
forts to pursue essential civil rights of litigants whom Congress and the 
Court have indicated should receive solicitous judicial treatment.43 
particularity requirement). See generally Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner, 768 F. Supp. 892, 896-900 
(D. Mass. 1991). 
39. See, e.g., Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984); Scott v. 
Rieht, 690 F. Supp. 368, 370-71 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
40. See, e.g., Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1977); Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 
1028, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1975). 
41. See 355 U.S. 41, 45-48 (1957). 
42. The questionable empirical basis is that civil rights cases are more frivolous than others. 
See, e.g., Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 925, 927 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., dis· 
senting) (assertion by judge); C. Keith Wingate, A Special Pleading Rule for Civil Rights Complaints: 
A Step Forward or a Step Back?, 49 Mo. L. REV. 677, 688 (1984) (assertion by author). See gener· 
ally Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 299-300. 
The federal judiciary may lack sufficient power, because the Advisory Committee expressly pro· 
vided for stringent pleading only in Rule 9 governing fraud, rejected heightened requirements in 
drafting Rule 8 originally, and has not altered these judgments while preserving a flexible pleading 
regime intended to serve restricted purposes. See Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1482 (5th Cir. 
1984) (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (judge questioning authority); Wingate, supra, at 692 (author 
questioning authority). See generally Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 299-300. 
43. Congressional indications are the substantive civil rights statutes and fee-shifting legislation 
mentioned in this essay. Court pronouncements are Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); 
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968). Cf. Adam Clymer, Debate O~·er Civil Rights 
Bill Raises Questions About the Law and Job Bias, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1991, § 1, at 22 (describing 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund report that concluded that Wards Cove'.r overall 
effect has "substantially dampened the willingness and ability of lawyers to litigate employment 
discrimination cases ...• [so that] claims affecting thousands of discrimination victims are not being 
filed."); Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 330-31 (discussing additional Rules' applica· 
tion in ways that disadvantage civil rights plaintiffs and other public interest litigants); Eric K. Ya· 
mamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
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D. Detrimental Implications for Civil Rights Plaintiffs 
All of these procedural developments in civil rights litigation have had 
numerous deleterious consequences. The developments have made it in-
creasingly difficult for individuals and groups who believe that they have 
suffered discrimination to institute, continue and win civil rights suits, as 
well as maintain any victories secured. The interpretations particularly 
disadvantage discrimination victims with limited resources, whom Con-
gress envisioned would act as private attorneys general vindicating civil 
rights of many citizens who are not before the courts. A number of pro-
cedural developments have undercut clear congressional intent in passing 
civil rights legislation that was frankly remedial in purpose. Congress 
meant, partially through providing procedural advantages and attorney's 
fees for plaintiffs who pursue civil rights in federal court, to rectify de-
cades of discrimination. Congress intended to eliminate discrimination, 
such as that rampant in the Birmingham, Alabama fire department.44 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress commendably attempted to 
remedy or ameliorate several problems that the restrictive federal court 
interpretation has created for civil rights plaintiffs. For instance, the leg-
islation removes onerous requirements that Wards Cove placed on em-
ployment discrimination plaintiffs and reinstates the proof regime 
prescribed in Griggs. This action should facilitate plaintiffs' pursuit of 
disparate impact cases.45 Moreover, Congress responded to the difficul-
ties that Lorance v. AT&T imposed on employees who considered chal-
lenging allegedly discriminatory seniority systems. The statute 
specifically provides that an "unlawful employment practice occurs" 
when a seniority system adopted with an intentionally discriminatory 
purpose "is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the seniority 
system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application of the 
seniority system. "46 
REV. 341, 349-81 (1990) (same and discussing other "efficiency procedural reforms" that reduce 
minority court access). 
44. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 777 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (first black lieutenant in fire 
department named pursuant to consent decree in 1981); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96 
(1989) (congressional intent in passing fee-shifting legislation); Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra 
note 2, at 312 n.252 (same). 
45. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, PUB. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (1991). See 
also supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text; infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
46. See § 112, 105 Stat. at 1078-79. See also supra note 9. 
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Congress also addressed the problems of Martin v. Wilks by signifi-
cantly limiting the opportunities for absentees to mount collateral attacks 
on consent decrees entered in employment discrimination litigation. It 
prohibited such challenges by (1) all individuals who, before entry of a 
consent judgment, had actual notice sufficient to be apprised that its en-
try could adversely affect their interests and legal rights and a reasonable 
opportunity to protest the judgment; and (2) anyone whose interests had 
been adequately represented by another person who challenged the judg-
ment on identical legal grounds and under similar factual circum-
stances. 47 In addition, Congress rectified one important deficiency in fee-
shifting jurisprudence by authorizing courts to exercise discretion in 
awarding prevailing parties their expert witness fees.48 
Numerous additional provisions of the legislation, which are less im-
portant to the procedural focus of this piece, should afford benefits for 
civil rights plaintiffs. For example, the statute permits certain victims of 
intentional racial and gender discrimination to recover greater damages, 
particularly in the form of compensatory and punitive relief.49 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 is, nevertheless, flawed, because it places 
too much trust in the judiciary's discretion to implement the statute. For 
instance, Congress left for judicial resolution several highly controversial 
issues, such as the meaning of "business necessity," as raised by Wards 
Cove. so This problem may be an intractable aspect of any effort to draft 
an enactment that attempts to rectify procedural difficulties for civil 
rights plaintiffs. Nonetheless, Congress could have drafted legislation 
that would have more sharply circumscribed judicial discretion and the 
courts' ability to construe the provisions narrowly. After all, it was the 
expansive exercise of judicial power and niggardly statutory interpreta-
tion which led Congress in the first place to pass the recent measure. 
47. See § 108, 105 Stat. at 1076. See also supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. Because 
Rules 19 and 24 cover myriad public and private law party joinder situations, Congress' decision not 
to amend the rules seems appropriate. See generally Carl Tobias, Amending the Other Party Jolnder 
Amendments, 139 F.R.D. 519 (1992). 
48. See § 113, 105 Stat. at 1079. See also supra note 26. 
49. See § 102, 105 Stat. at 1072-73. Congress, however, imposed caps on the amount of com-
pensatory and punitive damages that plaintiffs who suffer gender discrimination can recover. See id, 
For thorough analyses of the Civil Rights Act of 1990, which included many provisions passed in the 
1991 Act, see Sondra Hemeryck et al., Comment, Reconstruction, Deconstructio11 a11d Legislative 
Response: The 1988 Supreme Court Term and the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 475 (1990); Cynthia L. Alexander, The Defeat of the Civil Rights Act of 1990: Wadi11g 
Through the Rhetoric in Search of Compromise, 44 VAND. L. REV. 595 (1991). 
50. Section 104, 105 Stat. at 1074. See also supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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Moreover, the Reagan and Bush administrations have substantially in-
creased the number of federal judges who have read civil rights and other 
"social legislation" restrictively; in fact, Presidents Reagan and Bush will 
have appointed two-thirds of the sitting federal judges by 1993.51 
Congress also failed to address numerous pressing procedural compli-
cations that narrow federal court construction has engendered. The 
third section of this essay, therefore, provides recommendations for addi-
tional change that would be responsive to these procedural difficulties. 
III. CIVIL RIGHTS PROCEDURAL LEGISLATION 
Congress should seriously consider enacting a civil rights procedure 
statute. Such legislation would restore certain procedural advantages 
which civil rights plaintiffs have lost through restrictive federal judicial 
interpretation. In the alternative, Congress should at least remove the 
obstacles that such construction has imposed, which hurdles Congress 
recently failed to address in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. This article, 
which does not explore every statutory modification that Congress might 
adopt, recognizes that some problems may warrant additional study. 
Nevertheless, Congress can reach, and should rectify, the major remain-
ing difficulties resulting from narrow federal court interpretation in the 
area of civil rights procedure, just as Congress has in the substantive civil 
rights field and through procedural mechanisms in the new legislation. 52 
A. Federal Rules 
Congress should amend certain federal rules of civil procedure, mak-
ing the rules more responsive to the needs of civil rights plaintiffs. In 
1988, Congress adopted novel rule revision procedures to open the 
51. See Carl Tobias, The Gender Gap on the Federal Bench, 19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 171, 173-75 
(1990) (offering interpretations of the Reagan and Bush administrations' appointees); William Lilley, 
III & James C. Miller, III, The New "Social Regulation," 47 PUB. INTEREST 49 (Spring 1977) 
(discussing "social legislation"); Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on 
a Tradition, 74 JUDICATURE 294, 306 (1991) (explaining that two-thirds of sitting judges by 1993 
will be Reagan or Bush appointees). 
52. See, e.g., supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (procedural mechanisms in new stat-
ute); Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, PUB. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (substantive 
statute). Cf. Hemeryck, supra note 49, at 586-87 (describing additional substantive congressional 
responses to Court's interpretations). But cf. Roy L. Brooks, Beyond Civil Rights Restoration Legis-
lation: Restructing Title VII, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 551 (1990) (advocating broader substantive legis-
lation rather than statute aimed primarily at modifying rulings of 1988 Term); Derrick Bell, 
Foreword: The Final Civil Rights Act, 79 CAL L. REv. 597 (1991) (similar suggestion). The sugges-
tions offered are meant to be exactly that, suggestive, and they are intended to be representative. 
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amendment process to greater public scrutiny.53 Moreover, Congress 
has infrequently revised specific rules and bypassed the normal amend-
ment process, where the Supreme Court and the Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee suggest changes in which Congress effectively acquiesces. s4 
Nonetheless, Congress has intercepted an increasing number of proposals 
over the last two decades, while the Court and the Committee have 
evinced little interest in revising the Rules to make them more solicitous 
of civil rights plaintiffs and even have modified, or proposed to amend, 
some rules in ways that could disadvantage these plaintiffs. ss Congress 
also should revise certain rules before more federal judges interpret them 
in a manner which continues to erode Congress' intent in enacting civil 
rights statutes. 
One significant change that Congress could institute is to eliminate the 
elevated pleading that courts demand of civil rights plaintiffs under Rule 
8, thus restoring notice pleading. s6 The adoption in every circuit of strin-
gent pleading requirements, which are premised on minimal judicial au-
thority and little empirical data, has seriously disadvantaged civil rights 
plaintiffs. 57 
Congress coulcl also modify Rule 11. Since its 1983 amendment, Rule 
l l's implementation has been equally, if not more, problematic for civil 
rights plaintiffs. It forces many of the parties to participate in expensive 
satellite litigation and requires some of the plaintiffs to pay large sanc-
tions which chills their enthusiasm. ss Few compelling reasons exist to 
53. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073-74 (1989). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073(c)(l)-(2),(d) (1989). See gen-
erally Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Infonnal Discovery and the Politics of 
Rulemaking, 69 N.C.L. REv. 795 (1991). 
54. See Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules, 
43 RUTGERS L. REV. 933, 961 (1991). 
55. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1018-
20 (1982) (describing increased congressional willingness to intercept proposed rules); Jack H. 
Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. 
REv. 673 (1975) (same); Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 310-13 (lack of solicitude); 
Tobias, Rule II, supra note 2, at 524 n.150 and accompanying text (same). But see Letter from 
Judge Joseph Weis, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Aug. 9, 
1989) (on file with author) (increased solicitude); Letter from Professor Paul Carrington, Reporter, 
Advisory Committee (Aug. 7, 1989) (on file with author) (same); infra note 66 and accompanying 
text (same). 
56. Some courts have suggested such or have indicated that reliance on Rule 56 summary judg-
ment is preferable. See Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 299 n.181, 300 n.189 and 
accompanying text. 
57. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text. 
58. See George Cochran, Rule II: The Road to Amendment, 61 Miss. L. J. 5, 5-7 (1991); 
Tobias, supra note 21. See also supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text. 
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retain Rule 11 in its current or proposed form. The principal difficulty, 
litigation abuse, which prompted the 1983 revision has been amelio-
rated. 59 Rule 11 has achieved additional, significant purposes that under-
lay the amendment. Most importantly, the Rule has led numerous 
attorneys to perform reasonable prefiling inquiries, encouraging the law-
yers to stop and think before filing and reducing the pursuit of frivolous 
litigation. 60 
Although securing these goals and others is worthwhile, judges can 
accomplish the objectives with several efficacious measures that impose 
fewer disadvantages than Rule 11. Relatively effective mechanisms for 
deterring litigation abuse are Section 1927 of Title 28 of the United States 
Code, civil contempt, and tort suits, such as abuse of process.61 The 
sanctioning provisions in Rules 16, 26 and 37 cover considerable inap-
propriate litigation conduct that occurs before and after the filing of pa-
pers, thus limiting the need for Rule 11 or the continuing duty, an 
integral feature of the Rule preliminarily proposed. 62 
Both judges and commentators have offered numerous helpful sugges-
tions for changing Rule 11. Some observers have recommended that 
Congress make Rule 11 inapplicable to civil rights litigation or reinstate 
certain elements of the pre-1983 version of the Rule, such as a standard 
of subjective bad faith for imposing sanctions, especially for attorney's 
fees. 63 A distinguished committee of the bench and bar, which includes 
Judges Leon Higginbotham, Patrick Higginbotham, and Mary Schroe-
59. See Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, Interim Report on Rule 11, at 6-7 (Apr. 9, 1991); 
Schwarzer, supra note 28, at 1014-15. 
60. See Schwarzer, supra note 28, at 1014-15; Vairo, supra note 16, at 234-35. 
61. The initial two measures principally protect courts, while tort law remedies primarily pro-
tect litigants. See Tobias supra note 21, at 4. See also Tobias, supra note 54, at 959; infra notes 
78· 79 and accompanying text. 
62. See FED. R. C1v. P. 16, 26, 37. The continuing duty would require a litigant or lawyer to 
"withdraw or abandon a position after learning that it ceases to have any merit." PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS, supra note 19, at 77-78. See also Memorandum from John P. Frank, Lewis & Roca, 
to the Rule 11 Warriors (June 19, 1992) (on file with author) (Standing Committee agreement to 
soften continuing duty). A recent Supreme Court opinion increases the possibilities for sanctioning 
abuse pursuant to inherent judicial authority, thereby reducing the need to sanction with Rule 11. 
See Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991). Sanctioning under Rule ll's comparatively 
straightforward requirements, however, appears preferable to sanctioning with inherent authority. 
Exercise of that authority increases judicial power vis-a-vis Congress and parties whose vindication 
of interests Congress meant for the courts to facilitate. See also Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2141 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting); Tobias, supra note 54, at 948-49, 961-62. 
63. See, e.g., Cochran, supra note 58, at 27-28; Tobias, Rule JI, supra note 2, at 513-17, 522-25; 
Vairo, supra note 16, at 235. See also supra note 21 (Standing Committee agreement to revert to pre-
1983 notion of discretionary sanctioning). 
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der, recently suggested substantial modifications of Rule 11. 64 The com-
mittee proposed, for instance, that: (1) rule violations be premised on the 
"paper as a whole," rather than small portions of a paper; (2) that attor-
neys and parties have notice and opportunity to be heard before they are 
sanctioned; and (3) that any sanctions levied be payable into the registry 
account of the district court clerk. 65 
Congress may be reluctant to revise Rule 11 for several reasons. The 
1983 amendment of Rule 11 has been very controversial. Moreover, the 
Advisory Committee labored assiduously to develop the preliminary 
draft; it commissioned a comprehensive Federal Judicial Center study, 
solicited and reviewed written comments of 125 persons and organiza-
tions, listened to the testimony of sixteen experts during a public hearing, 
and diligently crafted proposed changes that it thought would respond to 
all of the interests that Rule 11 affects and that would improve the 
Rule. 66 Congress also may be unwilling to prevent the nascent proce-
dures for rule revision from running their course before it has had an 
adequate opportunity to ascertain whether they succeed. Nevertheless, if 
Congress and the Supreme Court adopt the Rule as preliminarily 
drafted, federal judges, as well as federal court practitioners and litigants, 
may experience another decade of difficulties as serious as those preva-
lent since 1983-namely satellite litigation, inconsistent judicial applica-
tion, and chilling of civil rights litigation. 67 
Finally, Congress should remove civil rights plaintiffs or attorney's 
fees from the purview of Rule 68's settlement offer provisions and pro-
scribe district court approval of civil rights class action settlements that 
are conditioned on plaintiffs' fee.waivers under Rule 23(e).68 The threat 
that civil rights plaintiffs may not recover post-offer fees, in light of the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 68 in Marek, has required some 
plaintiffs to settle prematurely and forfeit wide-ranging relief that would 
64. See Bench-Bar Proposal to Revise Civil Procedure Rule 11, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 159, 
159-74 (1991). 
65. See id. at 165-66. See also Memorandum, supra note 62 (Standing Committe rejection of 
paper as whole notion and restriction of sanction of fee-shifting to opponents). 
66. See Carl Tobias, Rule Revision Roundelay, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 236. See also CALL FOR 
COMMENTS, supra note 16. See generally Tobias, supra note 21. 
67. See Tobias, supra note 66, at 236. See generally supra note 21. 
68. The bills that the House and Senate passed in 1990 so provided. See Civil Rights Act of 
1990, H.R. 4000, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. § 9 (1990); S. 2104, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. § 9 (1990). See also 
NAN ARON, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE For ALL: PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JN THE 1980s AND BEYOND 
129 (1989). 
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have benefited numerous individual absentees.69 The Court's reading of 
Rule 23(e) in Evans has similarly affected potential civil rights plaintiffs 
by, for example, complicating their attempts to obtain counsel.70 Marek 
and Evans individually and synergistically may have created other 
problems, such as depleting the pool of attorneys who are willing to as-
sume the risks of representing civil rights plaintitfs.71 
B. Fee-Shifting Legislation 
Moreover, Congress should modify the federal judiciary's interpreta-
tions of fee-shifting statutes so that they are more responsive to civil 
rights plaintiffs. It has several means of treating Zipes. Congress could 
restore trial court discretion to award prevailing plaintiffs fees against 
intervenors or lower the standard for imposing fee liability on certain 
intervenors, especially those who do not make civil rights allegations or 
who do not assert their own constitutional or statutory rights.72 Corre-
spondingly, Congress might create a presumption that successful plain-
tiffs recover their expenses of intervention from defendants. 73 
Furthermore, Congress should re-examine federal court construction 
of fee-shifting measures involving questions other than that in Zipes to 
ascertain whether specific interpretations have so undermined legislative 
intent that amendment is currently warranted. 74 Congress should alter 
those rulings that have diminished the attractiveness of fee-shifting provi-
69. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. 
70. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. The application of Rule 68 apparently has 
been worse quantitatively and qualitatively for civil rights plaintiffs because defendants seem to have 
many more opportunities to invoke the offer of judgment provision than to negotiate fee waivers 
under Rule 23(e). 
71. For suggestions with regard to all of the rules mentioned and other rules that have been or 
could prove problematic for civil rights plaintiffs, see Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 
314-15, 318, 328-34. 
72. These two ideas are variations on a similar theme suggested by Justice Marshall in his Zipes 
dissent. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 777-79 (1989) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). He also warned that intervenors and defendants might cooperate to avoid all fee liability 
to plaintiffs. District judges should be alert to that possibility and punish the activity. See id. 
73. This is Justice Blackmun's suggestion in his Zipes concurrence. See id. at 767-68 (Black-
mun, J., concurring). 
74. That suggestion as to the Fees Act has been made. See Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra 
note 2, at 338 n.385. Cf. Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 494, 518-19 (1986) (explaining that the Court has interpreted Fees Act to make its 
provisions less attractive). See also Brand, supra note 7, at 369. Such an amendment might treat, 
for example, the difficulties Marek and Evans create, although amending Rules 23(e) and 68 may be 
preferable. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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sions. For instance, it should permit courts to use multipliers of lodestar 
fees to compensate lawyers for assuming the risks of loss. 75 Congress 
should correspondingly analyze whether the requirements enunciated in 
Christiansburg Garment for shifting fees from civil rights plaintiffs to de-
fendants-prescriptions analogous to those that many courts apply in 
finding Rule 11 violations 76-have similarly disadvantaged the plaintiffs 
and, therefore, warrant change.77 Congress should also re-evaluate Sec-
tion 1927 of Title 28 of the United States Code to ascertain whether that 
measure has adversely affected civil rights plaintiffs. The statute's rela-
tively stringent standard for fee-shifting-the unreasonable and vexatious 
multiplication of proceedings78-apparently has limited fee awards. The 
provision consequently has disadvantaged the plaintiffs somewhat less 
than Rule 11 and Christiansburg Garment. 19 
Finally, Congress should not be deterred by the argument that its re-
cent passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, after much rancorous de-
bate, has rendered unnecessary additional legislation. 80 Many members 
of Congress recognized that the new statute was a compromise measure 
and ultimately addressed numerous problematic Supreme Court cases of 
the 1988 Term. Indeed, before the 1991 Act even passed, several Sena-
tors vowed to introduce new legislation that would address controversial 
75. See supra note 29. 
76. Many courts find Rule 11 violations when prefiling inquiries are unreasonable or papers are 
frivolous. Cf supra note 25 and accompanying text (Christiansburg Garment's standard of "frivo· 
lous, unreasonable, or without foundation"). See generally Carl Tobias, Certification and Civil 
Rights, 136 F.R.D. 223, 226-27 (1991). 
77. I am indebted to Professor Torn Rowe, Duke University School of Law, for suggesting to 
me that Christiansburg Garment might be disadvantaging plaintiffs. I conducted a survey of recent 
cases, which indicates that fee-shifting under Christiansburg Garment has been less problematic 
quantitatively than Rule 11, but apparently has been equally or more problematic qualitatively than 
Rule 11. 
78. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988). 
79. I also am indebted to Professor Rowe for suggesting to me most of the ideas in this sentence 
and in the two textual sentences immediately above. A survey of recent cases that I conducted 
indicates that § 1927 has been somewhat less problematic quantitatively than the other two possibili· 
ties, but appears as problematic qualitatively as both. Section 1927 also may be less problematic for 
the plaintiffs because its terms expressly apply only to attorneys. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927. In making 
fee requests, civil rights defense counsel often invoke various permutations and combinations of the 
three possibilities. See, e.g., Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 531 (4th Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991); Danese v. City of Roseville, 757 F. Supp. 827, 828·29 (E.D. 
Mich. 1991 ). 
80. The issue of quotas was at the center of much of this debate. See, e.g., President Endorses 
Rights Compromise; Two Senate Leaders Predict Quick Passage, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1991, at Al; 
Senate Democrats Back a Compromise on Civil Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1991, § 1, at 1. 
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issues, such as caps imposed on the punitive damages which women can 
recover for gender discrimination. 81 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court and many lower federal courts have issued a 
number of procedural rulings that threaten the rights of minorities and 
women. The cumulative effect of judicial decisionmaking has impeded 
efforts of discrimination victims to vindicate essential civil rights and to 
fulfill the functions Congress intended for them as private attorneys gen-
eral. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 rectifies certain problems which civil 
rights plaintiffs confront; however, it fails to address numerous proce-
dural difficulties that the parties face. Congress must promptly pass re-
medial civil rights procedural legislation if there is to be greater progress 
in eradicating the national scourge of gender and racial discrimination. 
81. Senator Kennedy (D. Mass.) and Senator Wirth (D. Colo.) made such vows in the articles 
cited supra note 80. Until Congress acts, the federal judiciary should apply the requisite procedures 
in ways more solicitous of civil rights plaintiffs. For suggestions as to such enforcement, see Brand, 
supra note 7, at 369-79; Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 336-37; Tobias, Rule II, 
supra note 2, at 518-22; supra note 56. 
